Originally Posted by Quinn
Originally, like most people, I, too, associated Athens with the US and Sparta with the USSR. These are easy associations to make given the marked differences in how each respective state approached issues of governance, defense, trade, and its own citizenry. I think these conclusions are perfectly reasonable and valid. That said, if one looks at how success in the Peloponnesian War slowly, but decisively, changed not only Sparta’s foreign policy, but also its very character they will find the inverse to be true in many instances.
Think about it. Until the Peloponnesian War, Sparta had been a fairly insular state content to allow other powers (Athens, Perisa, etc.) their own spheres of influence – so long as they didn’t threaten Spartan dominance of the Peloponnese (Monroe Doctrine, anyone?). This closely mirrors the largely isolationist sentiment that dominated US foreign policy up and until the close of World War II and the onset of the Cold War, both of which produced definitive changes in Washington’s approach to issues occurring outside of the Americas (its own traditional sphere of influence).
By the close of the Peloponnesian War, Sparta had generated for itself an enormous amount of international good will by means of successfully portraying itself as a liberating power determined to stop Athens from subjugating the entirety of the Hellenes. However, once Sparta realized that, with the defeat of Athens, no power within the Hellenes could oppose its will, it became progressively more aggressive and arrogant. In short, the traditionally conservative and cautious Spartans – drunk with power – became sloppy in the allocation of their resources. So far as any historical parallel is concerned, Sparta’s unrivalled position and subsequent conduct at the end of Peloponnesian War closely resembles that of the United States at the end of the Cold War.
The aforementioned comparison becomes even more relevant when we consider that, within a relatively short period of time, Sparta went from being perceived as a liberator and protector to the primary threat by many states within the Hellenes. Slow to notice the changes that were taking place, Sparta’s leadership (Kings, Ephors, etc.) continued to overextend their state’s resources – particularly their manpower – in a series of foreign engagements they could ill afford. Sparta’s downfall can be directly traced to the manner in which it overextended itself attempting to continually perpetuate its hegemonic status at the end of the Peloponnesian War.
-Quinn
