Is war between China and the US inevitable? The Thucydides Trap.

[sukumvit boy]

Ancient principles of political realism from 460 BC describe the situation when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling one.

http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/06/19/are-china-and-the-united-states-headed-for-war

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thucydides

http://www.belfercenter.org/thucydides-trap/overview-thucydides-trap

[Stavros]

Is war between the USA and China inevitable? No.

What would such a war look like -naval battles, aerial bombardments? Is China going to rain missiles over Los Angeles from its warships off the coast of California? Is the USA from its bases in South Korea going to bomb Shanghai?

Why would war be the only solution and to what political problem? The US has opposed China's illegal occupation of the Spratly Islands but has not taken any action to prevent it, nor did the Philippines, one of the States with a claim on the islands ask the US for assistance, indeed Rodrigo Duterte has deepened rather than restricted his country's relations with China.

Could the war be a re-run of the Korean war with China pouring in troops and materiel to maintain the supremacy of the Communist Party in the North? Is China willing to go to war with the US over Korea again? If the war does not have a clear outcome, would even the current Generals in charge of the US military see it is a 'winnable war'? Presumably, victory would be the dissolution of, even surrender of the North Korean regime and the re-unification of Korea, is that achievable?

So if there is to be a 'war', it would not look like the conventional wars of the 20th century; it could be a cyber-war, a trade war, an info-war but what would they achieve and for what objectives? China has prospered because of its relations with the USA and the rest of the world, as is also true of the USA. Only an idiot would want to change that balance of power...

The President of the USA has been given permission to sell trademarks in China under his company names, a commercial advantage that he will want to protect along with the contracts his daughter has to Make In China not America her commercial products. The Constitution makes the President Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, yet this President has relinquished power to Defence and State and the Generals have extended US military actions in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Jordan, the Yemen and Somalia and want to increase it in Afghanistan so in theory they might see an opportunity for yet more millions or billions of dollars to be thrown at a problem they cannot control that produces outcomes that fail.

In any case Thucydides was trying to explain how the war between Athens and Sparta ran out of control once it had started, with pride and emotion being part of the mix that prevented a diplomatic solution, proof that whatever political cause leads to military conflict, once the conflict begins, the military takes over and creates its own agenda, and the fighting continues until someone decides to revive the talks about the politics that started it all.

Germany did not go to war with Britain and the rest of Europe in 1914 out of fear, it resented the fact that the British and French Empires were larger and more global, and wanted to dominate Europe as compensation for its lack of power elsewhere -it was a threat to the balance of power in Europe that mattered, just as Europe went to war with Napoleon's attempt to dominate Europe and replace existing monarchies with his own version, often staffed by members of his own family.

If you want to shift your gaze from China, try this, which argues the 'Thucydides Trap' is more accurately a description of war between the Red and Blue states of the USA...
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-real-thucydides-trap-will-red-blue-america-go-war-19063

[Stavros]

Reading this again, I stand by my post above with regard to China. Indeed, just as the President threatened to impose tariffs on China last week, so it now appears that he may be willing to suspend them if he can reach an agreement on intellectual copyright. Just as interesting is that the NYT today published an article which reported that Steve Bannon has said tariffs are the key to the administration being bold and implementing the original programme -the one he and Stephen Miller drafted for the Inauguration Speech- and that if the President does not go ahead with the tariffs it means he has sold out and become just another Republican machine politician. Compare that to what Ann Coulter said I think two weeks ago that it was the Wall which would define the authenticity of the 'new deal' in the White House. So I guess its take your pick: the wall or tariffs?

However, there is one sense in which the Thucydides Trap could apply, and that is emerging in the currently confused messages from France and the USA with regard to their reaction to the latest use of chemical weapons in Syria. The point would be that in both cases there are powers which may not actually be in decline, but believe themselves to be weaker than they once were. A major part of the platform on which the President based his campaign was the claim that under Obama the USA had become a weak player on the international scene, that other states were taking advantage of this weakness, and that only he could be relied on to revive American power abroad, even as it dealt the 'American carnage' of a 'Broken America' at home.

Similarly Putin has based a lot of his international affairs on the belief that Russia became a weak country under Yeltsin's 'leadership', that foreign interests took advantage of this weakness to extract wealth from Russia, and duped the Russians when Putin took over by telling lies abut Iraq and Libya in particular. Thus Russia's involvement in the Syrian war is a demonstration of its power, just as its interference in various election but notably the US Presidential election, and the chemical attacks on the UK are pokes in the eyes to remind us that Russia is a great and powerful state.

The Trap opens up when the two sides becomes hostage to their own rhetoric, insisting that an action must produce a reaction but in the Syrian context not offering a solution to the core problem -that Syria is a failed state without a functioning government with authority across the state, with political representation that is fractured and without legitimacy, a shattered economy, and the absence of civil society. As if often the case, a weak leader who relies on external forces to survive, if in some way removed from the scene would not by itself solve the problem of the State. To make it worse, the Syrian conflict has lasted so long because of internal divisions stretched by external actors, creating a separate layer of conflict between Israel, Saudi Arabia and the US on one side, Russia, Iran and Syria on the other, with Turkey playing its own role by focusing its military (assisted it seems by former members of Daesh and al-Qaeda) on the Kurds.

On the one hand both the Americans and the Israelis may feel compelled to act -Israel having attacked Iranians in Syria in the last seven days- but knowing Iran and the Russians will react, but not knowing how. This could in fact just be another round of gestures, such as the US air strike on Syria last year, but the potential for this to get out of hand is there, not least because the more moderate voices in the President's government have gone to be replaced by hard-liners like John Bolton and Mike Pompeo. Maybe Macron is urging caution; maybe the Generals are pointing out the limited options; but with the President under siege from Robert Mueller's investigation -the raid on his lawyer's premises is itself premised on the view the law has been broken- the President may seek some positive news if he can get it from a military response to the current situation in Syria.

It is indeed a trap, but will the President act, or bark loudly before taking a more moderate course of action?

[Stavros]

“Russia vows to shoot down any and all missiles fired at Syria,” the US president tweeted (https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/984022625440747520). “Get ready Russia, because they will be coming, nice and new and ‘smart!’ You shouldn’t be partners with a Gas Killing Animal who kills his people and enjoys it!”

Earlier this year he criticised Obama for telegraphing US military intentions in Iraq in advance, and on North Korea said the US was playing “a very, very hard game of poker and you don’t want to reveal your hand” .

Hmmm...barking from the White House in advance, showing your hand...who benefits from this?

[filghy2]

I can think of only one historical example where the previously dominant power was able to accommodate the rise of another power without conflict. That was when the US supplanted the UK in the early 20th century, which is probably an unusual case because of the high degree a cultural affinity between the two. Are there any other examples?

Of course, it may not be a direct, conventional war between the US and China. The US and USSR never fought directly during the cold war. But miscalculations can happen, particularly when adults are not in charge.

[Stavros]

I can think of only one historical example where the previously dominant power was able to accommodate the rise of another power without conflict. That was when the US supplanted the UK in the early 20th century, which is probably an unusual case because of the high degree a cultural affinity between the two. Are there any other examples?
Of course, it may not be a direct, conventional war between the US and China. The US and USSR never fought directly during the cold war. But miscalculations can happen, particularly when adults are not in charge.

I am not convinced by your example because while the US overtook the UK in terms of industrial production before 1914, the UK should really be thought of as the British Empire, which had more extensive global reach than the US although the latter had its own imperial possessions in Cuba and the Philippines and under the 'Monroe Doctrine' from 1823 claimed superior rights across the Americas to Britain. By that time the US had become the British Empire's most valued trading partner and because both benefited from their economic relationship there was no basis for conflict, whereas when the British Empire was in decline and had lost the dominance in the US it once had, relations soured, notably during the Suez War of 1956 when the UK went cap in hand to the IMF and the US refused to support its appeal for a short-term loan; and the USA's gradual undermining of British influence in the Middle East beginning with the intervention in Lebanon in 1958 and the cultivation of King Hussein of Jordan who was put on the CIA payroll around this time when he had been having internal problems with a confused group of Arab nationalists and communists.

There may be examples, such as in Latin America where, with the exception of the 'small' ie, not total wars- of the 1860s there has been an absence of inter-state wars, but a great deal of political violence within the state (article linked below); while it could be argued that South East Asian states such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand all grew around the same time between 1960-2000 without going to war with each other although Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand have all had internal political problems.
http://www.postwesternworld.com/2016/06/14/blood-nation-america/

War by proxy was a characteristic feature of the Cold War era, notably the use of clandestine 'terrorist' networks such as the Gladio network in Italy where the Communist Party was considered a serious enough threat to warrant the manipulation of elections and severe acts of violence; the wars of succession that followed the demise of the Portuguese Empire in southern Africa, and confrontations over Israel in the Middle East. In all cases the worst case scenarios -Cuba in the 1960s, China and the USSR in 1969, Israel and Egypt in 1973- nuclear confrontation was avoided through diplomacy and the reluctance of nuclear powers to use the weapons at their disposal.

The current US administration is significantly weaker than the Obama administration,most of the highest ranking officials appointed at the start of the Administration in Janaury 2017 have either been sacked or resigned; it has already lost three high ranking members of its National Security Council in the last year while appointing as its director a man known for advocating military rather than diplomatic solutions to US foreign policy; it has weakened the capacity of the State Department to offer informed advice to the President who, in any case, has little or no interest in it, relying instead on military men who may have their own agenda, and he is more concerned with taking a militant position because it sounds good on tv and is what his 30% want to hear.

That the President has telegraphed the USA's intentions in Syria in advance means that his Russian backers can move their assets from identified targets to avoid being hit; just as the Syrians can move any chemical weapons stocks they have at identified locations and move materiel from vulnerable airfields. Cruise missile strikes costing millions can then rain down on all but useless targets but provide the President with his glorious tv twitter moments.

Although there is a belief that the use of chemical weapons should not go 'unpunished' -as if the Syrian government cared- the longer term aim of the USA can be summed up quite easily.

Barack Obama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, and his successor craves it with a passion that may be greater than his passion for pussy (even more than money? This is conceivable). His scenario thus sees him talk up the prospects of war in Korea and the Middle East, only to then use his phenomenal (as defined by him) skills in drawing down the threat and thus opting for peace, though in fact he is incapable of ending the civil war in Syria or persuading Russia and Iran to stop supporting Bashar al-Asad, and it appears de-nuclearization in Korea means to Kim Jong-un something different from what it means in the White House.

Either way, he wants that Nobel Peace Prize, seeing it as a political Oscar more worthy than the Prize that was given to the Black Man he hates and upon whom he is dedicated to extract revenge.

[filghy2]

But we are talking about situations in which there is an established leading power and a rising power that is no longer willing to accept a subsidiary position. The question is whether they can reach an accommodation without resorting to conflict. As I said, I can only think of one case where this happened. I don't think Latin America or South East Asia are relevant because no country in those regions was in a position to dominate the others and, in any case, they were operating under US global hegemony.

Another book that is very relevant to this situation is Paul Kennedy's The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Rise_and_Fall_of_the_Great_Powers

[Stavros]

The question would be, did the USA think it was a subordinate power in the early 20th century? I don't think so. Moreover, while the US entered the First Word War to decisive effect in 1917, and although Woodrow Wilson saw this as an opportunity to place the USA at the centre of World Politics through his promotion of 'national self-determination' -an anti-imperialist project that was little different from what Lenin was advocating and which could be read as anti-British, the Republican victory in the 1920 Presidential elections led to the USA opting out of an international role in the League of Nations, so they did not challenge the British Empire at all.

Meanwhile it is reported in the Guardian:


Fears of a military confrontation between Russia and the West over Syria remain high, but Donald Trump has dialled down his rhetoric on the imminence of airstrikes against the Assad regime. (https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2018/apr/12/uk-russia-tensions-rise-over-syria-attack-and-salisbury-poisoning-live-updates?page=with:block-5acf31cfe4b0de1ce5dca4b0#block-5acf31cfe4b0de1ce5dca4b0) “Never said when an attack on Syria would take place. Could be very soon or not so soon at all!” the president said in his latest early morning tweet.

A “deconfliction” telephone line for Syria between Russia and the US is being used by both sides, the Kremlin has said. (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/12/syria-deconfliction-hotline-in-use-by-russia-and-us-says-kremlin) “The line is used and it is active. In general the line is used by both sides,” the Kremlin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, told reporters.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2018/apr/12/uk-russia-tensions-rise-over-syria-attack-and-salisbury-poisoning-live-updates



give the man a prize.

[filghy2]

Let me put it this way. Historical experience suggests X and Y are almost always followed by outcome Z. Which of these interpretations is the more plausible:
(i) X and Y lead to Z unless there are other factors that offset this tendency; or
(ii) X and Y do not lead to Z, which is caused instead by other factors?

In statistical terms, the only way that (ii) could be supported is if there are other factors causing Z that are independent of X and Y, but just happen to be correlated with them.

[Stavros]

Let me put it this way. Historical experience suggests X and Y are almost always followed by outcome Z. Which of these interpretations is the more plausible:
(i) X and Y lead to Z unless there are other factors that offset this tendency; or
(ii) X and Y do not lead to Z, which is caused instead by other factors?
In statistical terms, the only way that (ii) could be supported is if there are other factors causing Z that are independent of X and Y, but just happen to be correlated with them.

The real problem may be that Thucydides Trap only works for the original example, and that too many complicating factors in more recent history weaken the thesis. If that sounds like a cop-out, it probably is. I do see your point about Britain and the US, and I almost accept it, but those other factors just don't get it over the finishing line.

[Stavros]

Although I am still sceptical of a war with China, the way in which Xi has used his 'activism' to change the status quo in places like Hong Kong, and in the Spratly Islands, suggests that at some point there has to be a resolution which satisfies the non-Chinese states -the UK with regard to Hong Kong; the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam and Japan with regard to the Spratly Islands (and other isolated islands in the Pacific Region); while the internal campaign against Muslims in Xinjiang is proving impossible for external actors such as the US or the UN to deal with.

Xi is basically saying to the world what Milosovic did in the 1990s -'we are going to take a course of action, what are you going to do about it?'. I assume that collectively, the ASEAN powers could take some form of action against China, or at least open negotiations, yet China also assumes that the trading and investment relations it has with states like the Philippines will not deter its expansionist ambitions in the China seas and wider Pacific -in this context has Duterte weakened the Philippines by opting for a closer relationship with China rather than the US? Does Xi intend to end the autonomy of Hong Kong and integrate it into China as 'just another province' even if this violates the 1999 Treaty with the UK? Again, if he did, what is the UK going to do about it?

Far from going to war, Xi may calculate that China will get what it wants, and if the UN impose sanctions, so what? China can survive with sanctions, and in practical terms, how would Hong Kong be prevented from becoming a province of China? The question of Taiwan's independence offers a more stark proposition which Xi knows could be a step too far, but he has presented himself as the activist who no longer cares what China's rivals or competitors think because he has calculated they will not go to war but use forms of 'soft power' which China can ignore or deal with without reversing policy-creating what the Israels would call 'facts on the ground'.

The contrast is with Mohammed bin Salman in Saudi Arabia, who has been at war with Yemen for nearly 7 years, highlighting the fact that just as Saudi Arabia went to war to impose its will -and failed, becoming sucked into a never-ending war that costs billions with no benefit in sight- so China could go to war and find itself in the same position -that a mghty show of power exposes a military weakness, just as some might point to China's brief war with Vietnam in 1979, considered a defeat in both political and military terms. But MbS is a risk taker, and so is Xi, but with what consequences?

The Philippines, on paper, cannot win this conflict with China, but if both sides lose control, will the US get involved? And what are the military solutions -the expulsion of all Chinese personnel from the occupied islands? Does this mean a US or international/UN force permanently stationed on remote islands to deter a Chinese attempt to 'take them back'? A conference to make a definitive and judicially supported idenity of who owns these islands has never happened, and with so many competing claims, would it be doomed from the start? Isn't this why China has decided to impose its will on the area?

https://uk.news.yahoo.com/philippines-warns-china-boats-gather-104530069.html

https://uk.news.yahoo.com/philippine-presidents-aide-warns-unwanted-064434475.html

[Stavros]

Foreign Affairs Vol 100, No 4, July-August 2021, has a set of articles on China. I have read the overview by Jude Blanchette and recommend it to anyone with an interest in China and Xi Jinping in particular.
Blanchette goes through the purge of corrupt officials in the CPC that helped consolidate Xi's new leadership as a means of strengthening, indeed giving new life and purpose to the Party; the more worrying aspects of the economy -rising wages leading to global corporations moving jobs out of the country, a decline in annual rates of economic growth, with a decline in productivity- and the demographic 'time bomb' of an ageing population in a country which doesn't have as secure a pensions and welfare system that change needs to address.
Significantly, Blanchette discusses the 'risks' Xi is taking to ensure that in 10-15 years China will be the dominant Global power, with implcations for international relations in general, and for the Asian and Asian-Pacific region in particular. Whereas Mao was content to tell the Americans China can wait for 100 years before 're-uniting' Taiwan with the 'Mainland', Xi might be more impatient.

The article is mostly behind a paywall, but is worth a read -the opening paragraphs are here-
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-06-22/xis-gamble (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-06-22/xis-gambleThe)

The September/October issue has this article on bin Laden which is availabe in full here-

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2021-08-13/osama-bin-ladens-911-catastrophic-success


(https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2021-08-13/osama-bin-ladens-911-catastrophic-success)

[sukumvit boy]

Thanks,sounds very interesting. I am currently reading"China a History" by John Keay and have read much about especially ancient and early China in relation to art and Buddhism.

[holzz]

war won't happen anytime soon.
China needs a market to sell its goods to. The USA needs a place so its huge firms can manufacture stuff, and at a way cheaper cost. No way people will pay $5000 for an unlocked iPhone - that's if US workers made them.
If China claimed the Spratley Sea, I don't see the US stopping them. to be fair, why should they? Only if China threatens Taiwan, and maybe more importantly South Korea or Japan, will they intervene.

[filghy2]

People made the same argument before WWI that war was unthinkable due to economic linkages. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Great_Illusion

War's don't generally happen as a result of rational calculations. They happen because of politics, ideology and leaders' egos.

[holzz]

Britain nor France depended on Germany economically. But then back then there were severe tensions between them. France wanted revenge on Germany for the Franco-Prussian war and there also was the Anglo-German naval race. Nothing like that is happening now between the USA and China.

[rodinuk]

I think the South China seas and numerous islands are a subject of dispute and perhaps in the future the Moon will be the new area of dispute even?

[filghy2]

No serious tensions or rivalry between the US and China? Where have you been the past 5 years? Are you unaware of Trump's trade war? Have you never heard of Taiwan?

[holzz]

No serious tensions or rivalry between the US and China? Where have you been the past 5 years? Are you unaware of Trump's trade war? Have you never heard of Taiwan?

nothing that could potentially cause wars. there has been tensions between the West and Russia. Do YOU remember the poisonings in the UK, or warning shots? doesn't mean a war is imminent. shit like that happens all the time. comparing it to WWI is pretty silly at this point.

[sukumvit boy]

I think the South China seas and numerous islands are a subject of dispute and perhaps in the future the Moon will be the new area of dispute even?
109 countries signed the 1967 Outer Space Treaty which made it illegal to buy/sell land on the moon and other planets .However there is talk now about the need to update that treaty or create a new one.

[filghy2]

nothing that could potentially cause wars. there has been tensions between the West and Russia. Do YOU remember the poisonings in the UK, or warning shots? doesn't mean a war is imminent. shit like that happens all the time. comparing it to WWI is pretty silly at this point.

WWI was triggered by a relatively minor incident - the assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne by a Serbian. There was no rational reason why this should have led to a world war involving almost every major power.

I'm not saying war is imminent. I'm saying that if you have a build-up of tensions between two rival powers there is a risk that some spark will eventually trigger a conflict. It may not be that either side intends a war. It may just be a series of miscalculations where neither side wants to lose face by backing down, which seems to be how WWI started.

[Stavros]

In the cases of both the South African War (1899-1902) and the First World War, the Generals argued that the aims of the war would be met within a short period of time without major casualties or financial distress. The opposite happened, indeed, just as the British failed to understand how the Guerilla tactics of the 'Boers' would drag them into interminable mini-conflicts notably in the Transvaal, that the Generals had not planned for, so the cost of the war spiralled out of control =£25 billion in today's money, with 120,000 terrible casuaties and 22,000 dead.

In spite of the damage caused to the reputation of the Imperial Army, the Generals continued to plan wars based on 19th century strategic thinking, but again, underestimated the extent to which they lost control of the 'Plan' which had not expected the German 'Blitzkrieg' -the dual attack on France and Russia. Crucial to the outbreak of the war was the breakdown of the diplomatic system that had been created after the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, the so-called 'Concert of Europe', and the rigid beliefs that meant the Austro-Hungarian Empire regarded Serbian Nationalism, that had already laid waste to thousands in two wars, with contempt.

Today, the Chinese have imperial ambitions much as Kaiser Wilhem did in 1914, though they claim they are 're-unifying' China, as with Hong Kong, and its long term view of Taiwan. There is some sort of international order in the UN, but China has demonstrated its indifference to the UN and International Law with regard to the 1999 Treaty with the UK on the special status of Hong Kong, and the physical presence on the Spratly Islands. The key here is that the 'rest of the world' has not take any military action against China and does not appear to be preparing for it, as far as the Islands go, though the assumption is that the USA's security guarantees to Taiwan deter the Chinese, though we don't know if the Chinese Govt has a plan or just talks about re-unification as standard political rhetoric.

It is possible a small incident could spark 'a prairie fire', as Mao used to say, but right now the costs of such a conflict are pertinent to decsion makers, for the Generals are not supposed to recommend military action unless they are confident the objectives will be reached with minimum casualties and at low cost, though one doubts the loss of life is going to trouble the Chinese Government.

[filghy2]

The Chinese government is now communist in name only, so their only real ideology is Chinese nationalism - restoring China to what they see as it's rightful place in the world. If the Chinese economic miracle starts to falter they will want to play the nationalist card even more.

The problem is that the more they talk about reunification of Taiwan, the more they lose face by not acting on it - and voluntary reunification is now out of the question due to China's shift toward autocracy. The may calculate that the US has lost it's appetite for foreign wars after Iraq and Afghanistan. That seems the most likely source of possible miscalculation.

It's hard to place much confidence in accurate assessments of the achievability of military objectives when we have so many examples where this hasn't happened. In fact, miscalculation seems to be the norm rather than the exception. Over-confidence is probably built into the military DNA because their access to resources depends on convincing politicians that objectives can be achieved by military means.

[Stavros]

You make two important points. One concerns the actuality of military failure, given that successes are few, and even then have consequences- the UK did expel Argentina from the Falkland Islands, with the added benefit that the military junta collapsed, but it did commit resources to the Falklands that the UK Government had been trying to limit the decade before the invasion.

Again, the 'Coalition of the Willing' did expel Iraq from Kuwait in 1991, even though King Hussein had reached an agreement with Saddam that Iraq would withdraw his forces -a proposition rejected by the US. But the consequence was a disaster for the opposition in Iraq which faced the wrath of Saddam, while the presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia was the direct cause of al-Qaeda declaring war on the US (perhaps it should have declared war on the Wahab Government in Riyadh that permitted that infidel presence in the 'Holy Land of Islam?).

The second point is the more worrying, because Xi is a man with a mission, to change China's global status. Here, he is in the same company as Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, and Boris Johnson, and what unites these men is a fanatical belief in themselves and the passion for change -in Johnson's case not just the radical transformation of the UK, but the promotion of a 'Global Britain' outside the EU, a campaign that so far looks as ridiculous as it sounds, given that Johnson competes with Trump as the democratic world's most relentless bullshitter. That he claims to be a Conservative suggests that the term no longer has any meaning, though when it comes to change, Johnson is keen (we assume) to Conserve the Monarchy and the Military, though his faith in the Judiciary and Parliament seems insecure; just as Trump is only Conservative in conserving the wealth of the richest Americans.

I rate Putin the most dangerous -he has attacked the UK twice with impunity, he has annexed the Crimea, invaded and occupied the eastern Ukraine, has extended Russia's military presence in Syria, and may be about to forge a united military force with Belarus. Xi is also a threat, but your point on his bravura rhetoric requiring some proof of action is a concern. I believe Hong Kong will never be the same again.

You may be aware there was some sort of ill-tempered conflict in the Trotskyist movements in the 1960s when they couldn't agree among themselves if China and Cuba were Communist -in the case of China, their fidelity to Stalin and his ruthless state machine has underlined the Nationalist aspect of China, something that is clear to see when you go there, in particular Mao's Mausoleum. It is a matter of idle curiosity that he looks smaller than Lenin, who looks just as creepy now as he must have been when Bertrand Russell met him, and as far as I know, Lenin but not Mao spoke English.

As to the cost, Simon Tisdall claims the US alone has spent $8 Trillion on its military adventures since 2001-
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/sep/12/lives-lost-poverty-an-arms-race-rights-destroyed-the-continuing-cost-of-911

Here is Russell on his meeting with Lenin in 1920
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6TK9c-caEcw

[filghy2]

The Chinese system is really a form of nationalist authoritarian state capitalism, and the same can be said of Russia. Rich capitalists are accepted as long as they serve the interests of the regime. As such, they have more in common with the fascist regimes of the past. We even have a racialist element in China with the persecution of the Uyghars and Tibetans.

I always find it strange that so many right-wingers (especially in the US) who are anti-Chinese are relatively tolerant towards Russia. Both are seeking to dominate their neighbourhood and, as you note, Russia has the worse record in terms of overt aggression outside of its borders.

[Stavros]

Do you have any thoughts on the potential North Korea has to provoke a military incident? They claim to have tested cruise missiles wihich can travel 1,000 miles below radar, but we don't know how good they are, and the opportunity for a bad accident is there. Unlike his predecessors, Trump proved he was reluctant to take military action when the US or its forces were attacked, as they were in Iraq after the assassination of Qasem Suleimani, and Biden on the face of it doesn't look like someone keen to order any kind deployment -is someone going to see how 'tough' he is? Could it be somewhere else, such as Venezuela where China has invested billions, and the Iran has a 'strategic partnership' with the Government there...or must we wait for a second Trump Presidency, assuming he has the balls, given his priority is money and his gargantuan ego?

[filghy2]

These things are inherently unpredictable. We may know when conditions are such that a spark could set off a wildfire, but we can't know that the particular spark might be. The pre-existing conditions are arguably more important, because if it's not one spark it may be another.

It's ironic that 30 years ago people were celebrating the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war. That was a more stable world in the two dominant players accepted that their rivalry had to be conducted within certain constraints. A multi-polar world in which many players are unhappy with the status quo and the lead power is less willing and able to defend it is inherently less stable.

[Stavros]

Does the new US-UK-Australia 'strategic alliance' change the paramenters?

"The former British prime minister [Theresa May] asked Johnson: “What are the implications of this pact for the stance that would be taken by the United Kingdom in its response should China (https://www.theguardian.com/world/china) attempt to invade Taiwan?”
In reply, the prime minister was careful not to rule anything out. “The United Kingdom remains determined to defend international law and that is the strong advice we would give to our friends across the world, and the strong advice that we would give to the government in Beijing,” he said.
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/sep/16/theresa-may-aukus-pact-war-uk-china-taiwan

This from a man, Boris Johnson, whose Government freely admitted it intended to break international law with regard to Brexit and Northern Ireland....China must be like, so scared....

[filghy2]

Does the new US-UK-Australia 'strategic alliance' change the paramenters?

I doubt it. It's really an agreement to share nuclear submarine technology with Australia and there was already a de facto strategic alliance. After Iraq and Afghanistan would anyone be in any doubt that the UK and Australia are auxiliaries of the US military? I know the objective is deterrence, but it's striking that barely 2 weeks after the end of one US-led military debacle our governments are eagerly signing up for another adventure.

The real story from the Australian perspective is the debacle of the previous project to replace our aging submarine fleet, on which we've wasted many years and many billions of dollars only to start again. It's like something out of Yes Minister. "What should we do about this disastrous project that is running way behind schedule and over budget?" "Why don't we announce a new project that will be more complex, take much longer and cost even more?"

[broncofan]

Does the new US-UK-Australia 'strategic alliance' change the paramenters?

From the standpoint of Australia, perhaps the prestige of having nuclear powered submarines is attractive but it comes with the strings of having to serve as bait should there be some kind of provocation or threat. For the U.S it's a greater commitment to deter China militarily from invading Taiwan but is this a case where military deterrence even makes sense?

What would be the financial threat to China if it tried to annex Taiwan? China is committed to its economic growth. How catastrophic would it be for China to be cut off from world markets? How catastrophic would it be for countries to be cut off from China as a market?

[Stavros]

I doubt it. It's really an agreement to share nuclear submarine technology with Australia and there was already a de facto strategic alliance. After Iraq and Afghanistan would anyone be in any doubt that the UK and Australia are auxiliaries of the US military? I know the objective is deterrence, but it's striking that barely 2 weeks after the end of one US-led military debacle our governments are eagerly signing up for another adventure.
The real story from the Australian perspective is the debacle of the previous project to replace our aging submarine fleet, on which we've wasted many years and many billions of dollars only to start again. It's like something out of Yes Minister. "What should we do about this disastrous project that is running way behind schedule and over budget?" "Why don't we announce a new project that will be more complex, take much longer and cost even more?"

A rather bland response -you are right to argue that the US and Australia have had some form of strategic relationship for years, it goes back to the Second World War and Japan's ambitions for the Pacific region, not so different from what China's are today. I don't know if there is an anti-nuclear movement there which is opposed to the creation of a nuclear-powered fleet, given that your Prime Minister appears to have reneged on a deal Australia made with France to supply diesel-powered subs, though the hostility to fossil fuels in the 'Green' movement is probably as intense as it would be with nuclear power. And this also raises other concerns, such as the potential for a nuclear accident at sea, or even in port.

As Russia and China form or seek to form a strategic alliance, with India and now Iran getting involved, the worry for some is that the Pacific become the focus of a new 'cold war' with ships and subs monitoring each other, foreign ministries complaining about violations of soveregnty, Taiwan stuck in the middle of competing interests, and so on. It might not be of critical importance, but I think it merits concern.

[Stavros]

What would be the financial threat to China if it tried to annex Taiwan? China is committed to its economic growth. How catastrophic would it be for China to be cut off from world markets? How catastrophic would it be for countries to be cut off from China as a market?

If you read the assessments in the Foreign Affairs journal I cited some posts ago, you may appreciate that Xi's ambitions calculate that China can absorb external shocks as long as its domestic market is robust, much as it has not suffered so much from Covid in this regard, or so we are led to believe.

Xi is to some extent like Mao, and has so narrow a political a view that economics is interesting but not crucial to his ambitions. One of the key slogans in the 'Great People's Cultural Revolution' was 'Politics in Command'. Mao told Nixon or maybe it was Kissinger they didn't need to annexe Taiwan right now -'we can wait 100 years' was his view. I am not sure Xi wants to wait that long, more like 10 in his case. He has shown complete disregard for the legal treaty China signed with the UK over Hong Kong in 1999, and is evidently not bothered by any economic decline in HK. As far as he concerned, it is just another province in China nd the people must learn to obey the Party.

From this perspective, Taiwan is fair game, and any economic loss can be written off, as what Xi wants is glory. Sadly, the hubris that attends the lack of any signficant opposition to China's policies, domestically and internationally, could pave the way for the annexation, and let's be brutal about it -does Taiwan matter to the US, Europe or Australia and New Zealand? What would a war if there was one look like? Xi has thought about it, and it may be either a matter of time, or caution on the part of his Generals, who must deliver if the decision is made. For all the bragadoccio he has, there is not a lot of evidence that China's military is any good at war, indeed, though it was now a long time ago, the last time it went into the battlefied, China's army was defeated by the more battle-hardened Vietnamese.

As Brecht once put it, 'So many reports. So many questions'.

[filghy2]

What would be the financial threat to China if it tried to annex Taiwan? China is committed to its economic growth. How catastrophic would it be for China to be cut off from world markets? How catastrophic would it be for countries to be cut off from China as a market?

The recent behaviour of the Chinese leadership suggests they are willing to subordinate economic growth to other considerations. People used to argue that they could not risk any economic disruption because this would lead to social unrest. With the massive development of their surveillance technology, however, the regime might now be confident that they can suppress any unrest.

The threat of economic penalties seems to work as a deterrent only with smaller countries that need the rest of the world more than the rest of the world needs them. Australia is more economically inter-dependent with China than just about any other country. We could probably cripple the Chinese economy by cutting off coal and iron ore exports, but that would also cripple our own economy.

[filghy2]

I don't know if there is an anti-nuclear movement there which is opposed to the creation of a nuclear-powered fleet, given that your Prime Minister appears to have reneged on a deal Australia made with France to supply diesel-powered subs, though the hostility to fossil fuels in the 'Green' movement is probably as intense as it would be with nuclear power.

Ironically, the technical problems with the French project seem to have arisen mainly from trying to adapt a design intended for nuclear-powered submarines for use with a conventional power source.

There are clearly military advantages in using nuclear power. They can operate away from base and stay under water for much longer periods. Conventionally-powered subs must surface periodically, which makes them more vulnerable.

[Stavros]

Last night on Channel 4 News in the UK, Victor Gao insisted that Taiwan is a matter of domestic Chinese poitics, and thus of no concern to other countries. He also argued that neither the US nor any other state is going to send its sons and daughters to die in a place that has no relevance to them.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Victor_Gao

[Paladin]

Taiwan, is certainly fearful right now. But if we didn't have a corrupt, brain-dead, feckless, foppish, dolt in the WH right now then Taiwan wouldn't be in so much trouble.

[Stavros]

Maybe Taiwan wouldn't be such an issue had the Guomindang and its leader Chang Chung-Cheng not fled to Taiwan to create their own terrorist government, inflicting their 'White Terror' on the population not so different from the staggering murderous violence they had been visiting on the Chinese people since 1928. Biden was seven years old when that Terror began, so I don't know how he can be held responsible for a confict that old.

A little reading can help.

See, for example, for the perod pre-1949

Jonathan Fenby, Generalissimo: Chang Kai-Shek and the China He Lost (2015) -for the career of one of history's great mass murderers.

Immanuel C. Y, Hsu: The Rise of Modern China (5th Edition, 2000, Chapters 31 and 39 on the schism in 1949 and the economic success of Taiwan).

[BostonBad]

Before this war breaks out I'd like to orally pleasure all the beautiful and half decent looking Chinese TS women and swallow all their loads. It could take me 50 years but if that's the price for peace my stomach is ready for it.

FYI, if China attacks Taiwan the USA won't respond with the military. We're faking it.

[sukumvit boy]

Maybe Taiwan wouldn't be such an issue had the Guomindang and its leader Chang Chung-Cheng not fled to Taiwan to create their own terrorist government, inflicting their 'White Terror' on the population not so different from the staggering murderous violence they had been visiting on the Chinese people since 1928. Biden was seven years old when that Terror began, so I don't know how he can be held responsible for a confict that old.

A little reading can help.

See, for example, for the perod pre-1949

Jonathan Fenby, Generalissimo: Chang Kai-Shek and the China He Lost (2015) -for the career of one of history's great mass murderers.

Immanuel C. Y, Hsu: The Rise of Modern China (5th Edition, 2000, Chapters 31 and 39 on the schism in 1949 and the economic success of Taiwan).
The political history of Taiwan in the modern era is hellishly complex . I'm reading John Keay's excellent ,"China, a History" which focuses on the more ancient history of China's great dynasties up to and including the last ,Qing dynasty, which spanned the period from about the 1640's through 1912 and he decided to leave the rest ,which would probably require another volume , to other historians. These books you mentioned look like they would admirably fill some of that void.
Through ancient times and right through much of the Qing ,Taiwan was viewed mostly as a malarial wilderness inhabited by 'head hunting' aboriginal savages . At various times and in various geographical regions it could have equally been considered to be claimed by the Philippines, Japan ,mainland China and even the Portuguese and the Dutch.
Just as an interesting aside , the new science of ancient DNA analysis has reveled that the people who went on to settle Micronesia, Melanesia and the far flung islands of Polynesia came from the Philippines and Taiwan. This is discussed in more detail in the "Searching For a Stone Age Odysseus " thread.
https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/3896708-china
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qing_dynasty
https://cosmosmagazine.com/history/a-new-window-into-the-peopling-of-polynesia/

[Stavros]

The political history of Taiwan in the modern era is hellishly complex . I'm reading John Keay's excellent ,"China, a History" which focuses on the more ancient history of China's great dynasties up to and including the last ,Qing dynasty, which spanned the period from about the 1640's through 1912 and he decided to leave the rest ,which would probably require another volume , to other historians. These books you mentioned look like they would admirably fill some of that void.
Through ancient times and right through much of the Qing ,Taiwan was viewed mostly as a malarial wilderness inhabited by 'head hunting' aboriginal savages . At various times and in various geographical regions it could have equally been considered to be claimed by the Philippines, Japan ,mainland China and even the Portuguese and the Dutch.
Just as an interesting aside , the new science of ancient DNA analysis has reveled that the people who went on to settle Micronesia, Melanesia and the far flung islands of Polynesia came from the Philippines and Taiwan. This is discussed in more detail in the "Searching For a Stone Age Odysseus " thread.
https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/3896708-china
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qing_dynasty
https://cosmosmagazine.com/history/a-new-window-into-the-peopling-of-polynesia/

Thanks for these references, I am aware of the Keay's book through its glowing reviews, but in my own studies and work focused on modern China -amongst other places and regions. The movement or migration of people is so common throughout history I am not surprised at the genetic history you refer to. One should also consider how island people are more likely to have a maritime culture that looks across the seas rather than 'staying at home' -I am sure I read somewhere that traders from what is now Indonesia had links to what is now Angola in the late Middle Ages or thereabouts. There is a chapter on 'The World in 1400' in Eric Wolf's superb Europe and the Peoples Without History which traces all sorts of links you might have though improbable, and on the other level you are probably familiar with Karl Wittfogel's Oriental Despotism which argues the Imperial bureaucracy in China was developed and maintained through the dominance of China's mighty river systems, a form of 'hydraulic imperialism' that used water resources to build irrigation systems that boosted production in fertile areas and create it in less well-watered ones.

The issue of Taiwan though, is now seen as a domestic one in Beijing, and I don't doubt most Chinese thinks its none of our business what happens there. As to whether or not the US would go to war to defend the island, I don't doubt that miitary minds in China and the US have gamed the scenarios, and as the Foreign Affairs artice cited before suggested, a lot may now depend on just how ambitious Xi is, and the exent to which he thinks his risks will reap rewards.

Is Taiwan worth fighting for? Not in itself, but if the US has made a defence commitment to Taiwan, then as with NATO in the Cold War, the US and Israel, and of course the various treaties and agreements that did not survive Hitler's ambitions until 1939, not abiding by the agreement threatens more than just one place. If the perception is that the Biden Administration is too focused on the domestic politics of the US -which is currently in a crisis of legtimacy- to honour its agreement with Taiwan, this could lead Xi to 'do something' -and if Beijing does't care what the people of Hong Kong want, why should it be bothered with public opinion in Taiwan?

We live in dangerous times.

[sukumvit boy]

Maybe Taiwan wouldn't be such an issue had the Guomindang and its leader Chang Chung-Cheng not fled to Taiwan to create their own terrorist government, inflicting their 'White Terror' on the population not so different from the staggering murderous violence they had been visiting on the Chinese people since 1928. Biden was seven years old when that Terror began, so I don't know how he can be held responsible for a confict that old.

A little reading can help.

See, for example, for the perod pre-1949

Jonathan Fenby, Generalissimo: Chang Kai-Shek and the China He Lost (2015) -for the career of one of history's great mass murderers.

Immanuel C. Y, Hsu: The Rise of Modern China (5th Edition, 2000, Chapters 31 and 39 on the schism in 1949 and the economic success of Taiwan).
"The Rise of Modern China" certainly looks like the prefect follow up to "China, a History" which I am now finishing and I found a very cheap used copy on Amazon.
https://www.amazon.com/Rise-Modern-China-Immanuel-Hsu/dp/0195125045/ref=sr_1_1?crid=B5IO35WAG1NY&dchild=1&keywords=the+rise+of+modern+china&qid=1633812471&s=books&sprefix=the+rise+of+modern+%2Caps%2C219&sr=1-1
The Fenby book also looks fascinating.
Thanks

[sukumvit boy]

Thanks for these references, I am aware of the Keay's book through its glowing reviews, but in my own studies and work focused on modern China -amongst other places and regions. The movement or migration of people is so common throughout history I am not surprised at the genetic history you refer to. One should also consider how island people are more likely to have a maritime culture that looks across the seas rather than 'staying at home' -I am sure I read somewhere that traders from what is now Indonesia had links to what is now Angola in the late Middle Ages or thereabouts. There is a chapter on 'The World in 1400' in Eric Wolf's superb Europe and the Peoples Without History which traces all sorts of links you might have though improbable, and on the other level you are probably familiar with Karl Wittfogel's Oriental Despotism which argues the Imperial bureaucracy in China was developed and maintained through the dominance of China's mighty river systems, a form of 'hydraulic imperialism' that used water resources to build irrigation systems that boosted production in fertile areas and create it in less well-watered ones.

The issue of Taiwan though, is now seen as a domestic one in Beijing, and I don't doubt most Chinese thinks its none of our business what happens there. As to whether or not the US would go to war to defend the island, I don't doubt that miitary minds in China and the US have gamed the scenarios, and as the Foreign Affairs artice cited before suggested, a lot may now depend on just how ambitious Xi is, and the exent to which he thinks his risks will reap rewards.

Is Taiwan worth fighting for? Not in itself, but if the US has made a defence commitment to Taiwan, then as with NATO in the Cold War, the US and Israel, and of course the various treaties and agreements that did not survive Hitler's ambitions until 1939, not abiding by the agreement threatens more than just one place. If the perception is that the Biden Administration is too focused on the domestic politics of the US -which is currently in a crisis of legtimacy- to honour its agreement with Taiwan, this could lead Xi to 'do something' -and if Beijing does't care what the people of Hong Kong want, why should it be bothered with public opinion in Taiwan?

We live in dangerous times.
Wow, Wittfogel and Wolf are certainly a couple of interesting characters!
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl_August_Wittfogel#Oriental_Despotism
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eric_Wolf

[Stavros]

Wow, Wittfogel and Wolf are certainly a couple of interesting characters!


You may also be interested in these two books on geography and rivers. If you don’t already know them-

https://geographical.co.uk/reviews/books/item/3750-rivers-of-power-how-a-natural-force-raised-kingdoms-destroyed-civilizations-and-shapes-our-world-by-laurence-c-smith-book-review

https://www.amazon.co.uk/Prisoners-Geography-Everything-Global-Politics/dp/1783961414

I am currently interested in why some major countries have not created merchant shipping companies. The US enjoys access to two oceans, but has no merchant shipping with global reach to compare with Aristotle Onassis, Stavros Niarchos or the Scandinavians….why not?

[sukumvit boy]

That's interesting ,thanks.
I remember a few or my favorite authors and poets from the 60's were members of what used to be called the 'merchant marine', including Jack Kerouac ,Alan Ginsberg and Gary Snyder. And I remember the 'Seaman's Hall' down in lower Manhattan where card carrying 'merchant seaman could go to sign up for work.

[blackchubby38]

If you look back through history, there has always been animosity between China and the United States. If anybody is interested, check out the Chinese foreign minister's speech to the United Nations in 1950 before China launched its offensive in the Korean War. A lot has changed since then, with each nation going through its own domestic and foreign issues, but also the fostering of relations with each other both politically and financially.

Having said that, underneath it all, it seems the tension was always still there. Especially with China's rise as a global superpower and some of their shenanigans. So I been figuring out the best way to answer this question, but have been having a hard time putting my thoughts together. I read the following article though and I agree with some of the points that the writer brings up:

www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/11/us-china-war/620571/

So do I think war between China and the United States is inevitable, No. But I do think its possible. It just depends on what the United States is willing to go to war with them over. I don't think it will be over Taiwan though. Because that looks like the Korean War all over again and this time I don't think it would end in a cease fire.

[Stavros]

So do I think war between China and the United States is inevitable, No. But I do think its possible. It just depends on what the United States is willing to go to war with them over. I don't think it will be over Taiwan though. Because that looks like the Korean War all over again and this time I don't think it would end in a cease fire.

Thanks for the link to a fascinating article to stand alongside the article in Foreign Affairs linked some time ago.

A few thoughts-

1) China has flourished in an age of peace since 1989 which has both seen its own domestic wealth increase to levels unknown since the Opium Wars, and in return as part of Globalization provided us in the rest of the world with affordable products, from flat-screen tv's, computers and cameras to clothes. Even with a slow-down in its economy Chna is still doing better than the days when Mao was in charge. Convinced China had everything it needed, he was opposed to modernization in everything other than architecture, preferring the miserabilism of East Germany to the vernacular Chinese architecture so much of which was destoyed during the 'Great People's Cultural Revolution'

2) The difference now is that Xi sees himself as a new 'Mao' with ambitions that reach beyond Continental China and end the 'era of peace' to replace it with belligerent statemenst, and the physical occupation of islands in the South China Sea. One point not made in the Atlantic Article is that the occupation of the Spatly Islands that the Philippines successfully challenged in court, are not far from the major gas resources north of Palawan that Shell and the Phillipines have been developing for years now. But if the occupation of the Spraty Islands is illegal, so too would be the theft of its sub-surface gas resources.

3) Whether this increase in tension provokes Japan to repeal its military neutrality remains in doubt as I am not sure if public opinion wants this dimension to Japan's foreign policy to change.

4) The most likely flashpoint may not be Taiwan or even the South China Sea, but the border with India, with China at best annexing territory over which it fights with India. At the moment, Modi is more committed to a long-term plan to 'anonymize' the Muslim communities of India, an under-reported set of campaigns that a friend in India often sends me evidence of. Modi is as belligerent as Xi, and that is not good news for either India or China.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-53062484

5) The article linked below is from the RAND Corporation -for all the trillions it has spent and Xi's bellgerence, the lack of combat experience begs the question -how successful, if at all, would China's military be if it did engage another state? It points out for example, that even armies that have failed in one theatre can succeed in another if they have combat experience -thus, the US, which has combat experience but a string of military failures in recent years, may in fact see off any Chinese threat in, say, Taiwan, China becoming the victim of Xi's Hubris.
https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/11/chinas-military-has-no-combat-experience-does-it-matter.html

Consider:
--Iraq had the world's fourth largest land army in 1990, but in the field an ineffective one -it failed to defeat Iran through conventional means -Iran swallowed the 'bitter cup of poison' in 1988 largely through war weariness on both sides, lack of funds, and Iraq's use of US-supplied -and illega- chemical weapons. Having a large army is no guarantee of military success.

--Saudi Arabia fought a war with Egypt for control of the Yemen from 1963-1970 and lost it as the new Government was Nationalist and Republican, where the Saudis had supported the 'Religious' party associated with the Imams overthrown in the 1962 revolution. Since 1970 Saudi Arabia has spent well over a trillion dollars on its military, but there it is in the Yemen again, incapable of winning a war with all the resources at its disposal. Spending trillions of dollars on the military is no guarantee of success.

[blackchubby38]

Stavros:

Regarding this point in your post:

3) Whether this increase in tension provokes Japan to repeal its military neutrality remains in doubt as I am not sure if public opinion wants this dimension to Japan's foreign policy to change.


I have often thought that a good way to keep in China in check would be for Japan to repeal its military neutrality and starting developing offensive weapons and forces. I also feel that the nation has done its time for its actions before and during WW II and I think they can be trusted to have a military again.

But I think if they did, it would be make China feel like they were really being encircled by allies of the United States (Japan and South Korea) and that may make provoke them into making a first strike against either one of those two countries or against other U.S. interests. So in the end, that might not be a good idea.

[Stavros]

You identify a genuine dilemma, and I agree that for Japan to end its military neutrality would alter the 'balance of power' in the Pacific Region, given that China might see such a move as an additional threat to add to the AUKUS agreement giving Australia a more toxic anti-Chinese position than it has had in recent years. I don't know if such a move would be popular in Japan, which does have a hard core of Nationalists, but where the ruling party doesn't seem keen to spend money on Defence that a change in strategy would entail.

It may not be a surprise that Americans have suggested Japan change to counter the Chinese 'threat'- the link below to a talk that was given at Chatham House in London earlier this year makes comparisons to Germany after 1945. Re-heating the claims that the USSR had a strategic plan to annexe the whole of Germany thus justifying the re-armament of Germany in 1950 the authors in my view are mistaken because of the quite different context from that Japan found itself in after 1945- Germany was a divided country on the European continent bordering the USSR.

Also, the two authors, (one of them [Eldrige Colby] is associated with the Marathon Initiative and the Center for a New American Security), make no mention of how Japan's 'soft power' through its economic and technological growth sine 1945 and its investments in China, South Korea and the Philippines, has been a more positive benefit than the Shinto Empire it imposed on the region in the first half of the 20th century. Why would Japan want to replace a successful strategy with one that might contrbute to a reversal of it and the region's gains?

At the moment, Xi is the focus of concern, because of his dominant influence in the Communist Party, his belligerent rhetoric and actions -he is perhaps testing the resolve of his perceived adversaries to find out how much he can get away with without actually sending in the troops. Hong Kong has been easy, Taiwan is anything but.

Incidentally, I raised this with my Indian friend yesterday, who regards Modi as weaker than Xi, that is, Modi doesn't have absoute power in India, and is more focused on internal politics, and the potential problems posed by the Taliban in Afghanistan, in itself, and in relation to potential meddling in Kashmir. I am not sure either India or China have a military with enough combat experience to give it a go in the Himalayas. We wait and see.

Chatham House article here-
https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/06/japan-must-disavow-pacifism-collective-defence

[Stavros]

Given the tensions that exist with Russia and what is seen by many as a Proxy War in which NATO countries are in effect arming Ukraine, and given the shock Russia's failures has been to China, their long-established aim to 're-unite' Taiwan with the mainland did not need so provocative an act by Speaker Nancy Pelosi.

She has been 'defiant', saying China cannot tell her what countries in Asia she can visit, but she never needed to visit at all. If she wanted to talk to President Tsai, she could do so by Zoom. I don't see how anyone familiar with the current modus operandi in China can expect anything other than the response we have seen. It could be a provocation for President Xi in the sense that members of his own party think he is too reckless for the country and China needs to draw back from its imperial ambitions in the Pacific Region to focus more on domestic and international trade, or it could give Xi the impetus to go further.

Not so sure, because the failure of Russia to annexe Ukraine has been a warning, that annexing Taiwan might not be as easy as he thinks it is. Or, China could push the boundaries to see how far the US is in fact willing to go to 'save Taiwan'. Moreover, while NATO might think opening a new front in Eastern Europe would stretch Russia's military to breaking point (eg, Belarus), Russia and China together could open a new front for the US which it is incapable of dealing with.

So the last thing we need is a loud-mouth from Congress saying things we already know in a manner that is likely to cause more harm than we want. The best thing to hear from Pelosi is her retiring from politics, the sooner the better.

[MrFanti]

If you're a Western business owner and outsourcing to China or doing business with China, then you're part of the problem.
That being said, you can cure your problem by outsourcing and doing business to/with Africa, Mexico, Central America, South America, and a few other places as well.

[Stavros]

If you're a Western business owner and outsourcing to China or doing business with China, then you're part of the problem.
That being said, you can cure your problem by outsourcing and doing business to/with Africa, Mexico, Central America, South America, and a few other places as well.

Setting aside your personal objection to China, the intriguing aspect of your comment is the way in which, since the start of the Pandemic, though it has roots in 2008, international trade that developed global supply chains starting in the 1980s, is now in the process of questioning their efficiency.

On the one hand, China became an irresistible location because of a tamed, obedient non-unionised workforce, low labour and transport costs, and the volume of commodities that could be made. This does not discount the supply chains that source products elsewhere in Asia, but had the additional benefit of enabling China to develop its domestic market to the extent that it has not become dependent on external trade, which was a curse for other 'developing countries' as they were once known -these days re-branded as 'Investment Destinations'.

On the other hand, the global supply chain in commodities key to managing the Pandemic could not cope with demand, so the 'turn' against China is not just a political response to the kind of imperial activism that President Xi believes will cement his reputation as the heir of Mao, but an economic one in which manufacturing may seek a new deal in its country of origin, thus creating an agenda in which Economic Nationalism is viewed as a preference. Trump in 2017 was not the only political leader to promote this cost-heavy alternative to China, which in reality also meant a rejection of Asia. The potential crisis in semi-conductor production in Taiwan, a major source, if tensions with China spiral out of control, is another example of how capitalists are viewing global supply chains with scepticism.

Whether or not Apple, IBM and others can afford to make hardware and software in the US, is open to debate. The opportunity to shift production from China or Taiwan to, say, Honduras would not make sense right now. Honduras does have a growing economy relative to the rest of Central America, but remains a deeply divided country, with agriculture still dominant, along with a lethal narcotics industry, widespread poverty and crime, and corruption of the kind endemic in the region. Industrial production would be starting from zero, and thus require capital expenditure that would not be needed in, say, Indiana, though labour costs would be higher. Unless, without irony, the Corporations did shift to Indiana but then hired workers from Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala, in an effort to deter illegal immigration from those countries.

And as American firm re-located south of the border for tax purposes and cheaper labour costs, again in the 1980s and since, one can say that to some extent this model has been around for some time.

But economic nationalism may actually mean economic decline, as the great Brexit flop demonstrates. With the promised boon of global trade 'liberated' from the collective regulations of the European Union, the UK has found that in fact other States prefer the EU, or in the case of Japan, signed a deal which was close to the one the UK had already. The bottom line being that trade with the EU has declined -exports to the UK have declined by 14%, imports have declined by 25%.

We are all better off together.